Topic: Legal

Legal side of Reputation Management

Association Isn’t Liable for Its Members’ Message Board Postings–Inge v. Central Motorcycle Roadracing Association 0

[It’s impossible to blog about Section 230 without reminding you that it remains highly imperiled.]

Political turmoil can emerge in any community. This case involves a contested election for the Central Motorcycle Roadracing Association’s board. Unsuccessful candidate Inge claimed the organization’s leadership stuffed the ballot box. The fracas spilled over to the CMRA’s online discussion forums, and Inge claims he was defamed there. He sued the organization and various folks associated with it. Would it surprise you to learn that, in his day job, Inge is a litigator?

Perhaps surprisingly, Texas’ strong anti-SLAPP law wasn’t discussed. Nevertheless, Section 230 protects the organization from its members’ postings:

The Court concludes that dismissal is proper insofar as Inge brings this defamation claim against CMRA for posts on its online forum. As an interactive computer service, CMRA is immune from liability for defamatory posts made by its online forum’s users. Inge attributes most of the alleged defamatory statements to individuals who are defendants in this case. The three exceptions are statements ten, fourteen, and fifteen—comments made by nonparties Jessie Davis, Keith Hertell, and Marian Orchard. Because they are not parties to this suit and because CMRA cannot be held liable for their alleged defamatory posting, the Court dismisses Inge’s defamation claim with respect to those three statements.

This case brought to mind the Weigand v. NLRB ruling, where a union wasn’t liable for its members’ online postings–though the ruling didn’t rely on Section 230. It’s nice to have a Section 230 complement about organizations’ liability for running message boards for member discussion. (The Second Circuit’s Ricci ruling in the same genre, but it only addressed GoDaddy’s liability as host, not the union’s liability).

Note: the court included the online comments at issue: “Statement ten: “Take a step back from your keyboard and think for a second. Who in the **** really cares?…Didn’t make the board of directors for [CMRA]? So yer [sic] gonna [sic] sue? Yeah. And I’m what’s wrong with America. What a ****ing joke.” Statement fourteen: “As a long time CMRA member, (18 years) I’ve never seen such a C[**]T!!!.” Statement fifteen: “I’m sure this whole @(#$*@#$ thing wouldn’t have happened had someone paid attention and aired their grievances in the appropriate (and frequently requested) manner.”” Statements 10 and 14 especially looked like a huge stretch for defamation anyway.

Case citation: Inge v. Walker, 2017 WL 4838981 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017)


Source: Eric Goldman Legal

Is Wikileaks Protected by Section 230? The Trump Campaign Thinks So 0

Wikileaks

[It’s impossible to blog about Section 230 without reminding you that it remains highly imperiled.]

In Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President (see the amended complaint), the Trump campaign is being sued for allegedly colluding with Wikileaks and the Russians to disclose the plaintiffs’ private information in the DNC email dump. I have no opinion about the merits of the lawsuit generally.

However, I do have thoughts about the arguments in Trump campaign’s motion to dismiss that Section 230 immunity applies to Wikileaks, and that immunity eliminates any conspiracy by negating any illegal act. On this point, the brief says (in total):

Plaintiffs likewise cannot establish vicarious liability by alleging that the Campaign conspired with WikiLeaks. Under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230), a website that provides a forum where “third parties can post information” is not liable for the third party’s posted information. Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014). That is so even when even when the website performs “editorial functions” “such as deciding whether to publish.” Id. at 1359. Since WikiLeaks provided a forum for a third party (the unnamed “Russian actors”) to publish content developed by that third party (the hacked emails), it cannot be held liable for the publication.

That defeats the conspiracy claim. A conspiracy is an agreement to commit “an unlawful act.” Paul v. Howard University, 754 A.2d 297, 310 (D.C. 2000). Since WikiLeaks’ posting of emails was not an unlawful act, an alleged agreement that it should publish those emails could not have been a conspiracy.

Does Wikileaks Qualify for Section 230 Immunity?

At first glance, it looks like Wikileaks should qualify for Section 230 protection in this case. A prima facie Section 230 defense has 3 elements:

  • Provider/User of an ICS: As a website, Wikileaks qualifies.
  • Publisher/Speaker Claims. The amended complaint references the term “publish” (or variants like “publisher”) 40 times, so that’s a good clue the complaint treats Wikileaks as a publisher. The fact that humans at Wikileaks may have made the specific editorial decision to publish the content (as opposed to, say, providing tools that automatically posted content uploaded by users such as the Russians) does not change the analysis. It reinforces that Wikileaks exercised the editorial discretion that Section 230 protects. This element surely will be satisfied.
  • Claims based on information from another information content provider. The complaint alleges that the Russians provided the DNC emails to Wikileaks. Whether we treat the Russians, the DNC, or the email authors as the initial “information content provider,” either way the DNC emails are third party content to Wikileaks. The fact that the DNC emails were originally stolen does not change their character as third party content.

Some reasons why Section 230 nevertheless may not apply:

Extraterritorial Application: The complaint doesn’t specify where Wikileaks is located. Wikileaks doesn’t explain its location either. Wikileaks describes itself as a “multi-national media organization” and claims it “has more than one hundred other staff accross [sic] the Americas, Africa, Eurasia and the Asia Pacific.” So, is Wikileaks is located in the United States? If not, does Section 230 nevertheless immunize an international defendant being sued in a US court? I think that Section 230 applies to all defendants being sued in US courts regardless of their location, but I cannot recall a similar case raising this question squarely. If you think of a case I’m forgetting, please let me know.

The SPEECH Act (the anti-libel tourism law) does not apply to this situation. First, it only applies to defamation claims. Second, it only applies to foreign judgments being enforced in the US, not litigation initiated in US courts.

The Batzel Exception: In Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit said an online publisher qualified for Section 230 immunity only for materials that third parties submitted to it for publication. If the materials were submitted to the publisher for some other purpose (or with some expectation that they would be kept confidential), but the publisher made the unilateral decision to publish the materials anyway, Section 230 wouldn’t immunize that publication decision. So the question here is whether the DNC materials were submitted to Wikileaks with an expectation of publication. Based on the complaint’s allegations, it seems pretty clear that the Russians allegedly submitted the DNC emails to Wikileaks with the intent that it be published, so I don’t think the Batzel distinction would limit Section 230’s availability. I’ve always considered the Batzel case a tortured decision, so I’m not sure if other courts would really follow it.

The IP Exception: The plaintiffs are suing for privacy rights violations (e.g., public disclosure of private facts). Ordinarily, Section 230 preempts privacy claims. However, Section 230 expressly excludes “IP claims,” and that exclusion applies to publicity rights claims in all jurisdictions outside the 9th Circuit (this case is in the DC Circuit). Common law public-disclosure-of-private-facts claims are related to the publicity rights claims in that they are two of Prosser’s four privacy torts. Would a court stretch the IP exception to exclude the sibling claims to a publicity rights claim? I doubt it, and courts shouldn’t do so.

The ECPA Exception: Section 230(e)(4) says: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar State law.” What does the ECPA exception mean? Cases rarely discuss it. I did a quick Westlaw search and found only 10 cases referencing Section 230(e)(4), most of those just citing the statute without discussion (see, e.g., UCS v. Lycos, saying that exception didn’t apply because the plaintiff didn’t allege an ECPA violation). Furthermore, because the ECPA doesn’t have a clear doctrine of secondary liability, it’s hard to construct a prima facie case that implicates Section 230.

This exception comes up because it’s probable that the DNC hack involved an ECPA violation. Does that mean that Wikileaks’ further disclosures of the materials obtained in violation of the ECPA might fit into this exception? The leading case on this topic is the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Doe v. GTE, which involved the recording of locker room activity and the public sale of those recordings in likely violation of the ECPA. Can GTE, which hosted the site selling the illegal material, qualify for Section 230 protection despite the initial ECPA violation? The court’s ruling is tortured and has not been followed by most other courts, but the court concluded that the initial ECPA violation didn’t affect GTE’s Section 230 defense, despite Section 230’s ECPA exception. The same will likely apply to Wikileaks.

Does Wikileaks’ Eligibility for Section 230 Resolve the Conspiracy Claim Against the Trump Campaign?

While Section 230 should provide immunity to Wikileaks, does that immunity then mean that there’s no conspiracy because no illegal act took place? The motion to dismiss invests nearly no energy on this topic, saying simply: “Since WikiLeaks’ posting of emails was not an unlawful act, an alleged agreement that it should publish those emails could not have been a conspiracy.”

I’m not convinced. The problem is that Section 230 is an immunity from lawsuits, not a declaration of what’s legal or illegal. For example, behavior immunized by Section 230 can still be illegal under one of its various exceptions, such as IP, ECPA and federal criminal prosecutions. The latter exception provides a pretty good clue that Section 230 doesn’t render the immunized behavior “legal.” For example, if the US Department of Justice were to prosecute Wikileaks (which reports indicate is being considered), Wikileaks could not invoke Section 230 against that prosecution–so, in theory, it could be convicted for its activities. Therefore, I’m not sure that Section 230’s immunity from some lawsuits dictates the conclusion that Wikileaks did not act illegally. At minimum, the legal analysis deserved more than a single sentence.

Note 1: Section 230 doesn’t necessarily preempt conspiracy claims. See, e.g., Tanisha v. Chandra. However, the Tanisha case’s exception for conspiracy claims doesn’t apply because the Trump campaign is invoking Section 230 as a defense for Wikileaks’ conduct rather than as a direct immunity for its own conduct.

Note 2: General Steel v. Chumley (10th Circuit 2016) said: “Section 230 of the CDA provides immunity only from liability, not suit.” It made this statement in the context of a procedural issue (whether Section 230 supported interlocutory appeal), and I don’t believe that opinion addresses whether the Section 230 makes the underlying activity legal.

So my conclusion: I think Wikileaks probably qualifies for Section 230 immunity in this case. I’m not confident that the immunity negates the predicate illegal act required to form a conspiracy. Though it’s beyond the scope of this blog post, to be clear, the campaign could have other powerful defenses beyond Section 230. The First Amendment and Bartnicki v. Vopper come to mind.

Does This Filing Mean Trump Likes Section 230?

In SESTA and the Wagner bill, Congress is considering major amendments to Section 230 that would severely damage the immunity. Does the Trump campaign’s reliance upon a Section 230 defense suggest that Trump likes Section 230? That he would oppose any amendments to Section 230 that would undermine the immunity’s scope? That perhaps he might even oppose or veto SESTA or the Wagner bill? That the Trump administration might seek to “export” Section 230 in trade agreement renegotiations like NAFTA?

As we know, Trump routinely takes duplicitous positions. He just cares about winning, so if an argument could help him win in one case and a contradictory argument could help him win in a different case, he will freely talk out of both sides of his mouth without hesitation. For example, Trump is a serial defamation litigant. He has draped himself in the First Amendment flag on the defense side, while at the same time threatening to “open up libel law” and taking anti-First Amendment positions on the plaintiff side.

So I do not believe that the Trump campaign’s embrace of Section 230 in this case signals any true support for Section 230. Instead, I’m pretty confident that, if passed by Congress, Trump would sign SESTA or the Wagner bill so he could claim personal credit for the legislation (and because it would be well beyond his abilities to grasp how the bills would undermine Section 230).


Source: Eric Goldman Legal

Another Court Rejects ‘Material Support To Terrorists’ Claims Against Social Media Sites–Gonzalez v. Google 0

[It’s impossible to blog about Section 230 without reminding you that it remains highly imperiled.]

Numerous lawsuits have been filed claiming social media services “materially support” terrorists because terrorist groups disseminate their content via the services. 1-800-LAW-FIRM (I kid you not) is behind most of these lawsuits. I’ve been baffled by the proliferation of these lawsuits because they seem doomed, yet more cases have been filed even after two courts (in Fields v. Twitter and Cohen v. Facebook) have thoroughly rejected them. Now, a third court has echoed and extended the prior two dismissals, reinforcing why I think all of these lawsuits will fail.

This lawsuit involves YouTube. The plaintiffs allege that ISIS posted YouTube videos and these videos proximately caused the plaintiffs’ deaths in a terrorist attack in Paris. YouTube moved to dismiss on Section 230 grounds.

Before addressing the merits of the Section 230 defense, the court reaches three helpful preliminary conclusions:

  • Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) in 2016 to expand civil claims based on material support for terrorists. The plaintiff argued that the later-enacted JASTA repeals Section 230. The court disagrees, concluding that JASTA didn’t expressly or impliedly repeal Section 230.
  • Section 230 applies to extraterritorial (i.e., international) conduct. Cite to Cohen.
  • Civil claims based on federal crimes aren’t preempted by Section 230. Cites to Cohen and Doe v. Backpage.

The court then addresses the merits of the Section 230 immunity.

Like the prior cases, the plaintiffs argued that it was suing for YouTube’s provision of accounts to ISIS, not for content published via the accounts. The court restates that the plaintiffs’ argument “essentially tries to divorce ISIS’s offensive content from the ability to post such content.” The court is unpersuaded:

The SAC is replete with detailed descriptions of the actual content that ISIS has posted on YouTube in furtherance of its terrorist activity, including over 15 pages of allegations of “ISIS’s extensive use of Google’s services” to disseminate its terrorist message. In this way, Plaintiffs’ claims are inextricably bound up with the content of ISIS’s postings, since their allegations describe a theory of liability based on the “essential” role that YouTube has played “in the rise of ISIS to become the most feared terrorist organization in the world.”…If the court were to apply Plaintiffs’ logic and ignore the content of any ISIS-related YouTube postings in construing Plaintiffs’ claims, it would be impossible to discern a causal basis for Google’s alleged responsibility for the terrorist attacks.

The court easily concludes: “Plaintiffs seek to treat Google as the publisher of ISIS’s video content.”

Riffing on the same theme, the plaintiffs claimed YouTube loses Section 230 immunity by “allowing accounts that are taken down to rapidly ‘reconstitute’ by permitting bulk friend/follow requests, and failing to take steps to minimize or mitigate ‘incremental naming’ of accounts.” Citing Roommates.com, the court responds: “Plaintiffs seek to hold Google liable for failing to adopt a strategy to defeat activity such as account reconstitution and bulk friend/follow requests; to the extent the objective of such a strategy is to control who can publish content, section 230(c)(1) immunizes Google’s decision not to adopt that strategy.”

The plaintiffs also claimed that YouTube helped develop ISIS’s content by delivering targeted ads around the videos. As the court flatly responds: “This theory finds no support in the case law.” Citing Roommates.com (again) and Jones v. DirtyWorld, the court explains:

Plaintiffs do not allege that Google “materially contribut[ed]” in any way to the actual content of ISIS’s YouTube videos. They do not claim that Google’s ads (which are themselves third-party content) are objectionable, or that the ads played any role in making ISIS’s terrorist videos unlawful.

The court also suggests that YouTube’s ad targeting algorithm is “content neutral.” Thus, “Google’s provision of neutral tools, including targeted advertising, does not equate to content development under section 230, because as currently alleged, the tools do not encourage the posting of unlawful or objectionable material….Google’s ad pairings do nothing to enhance the unlawfulness of ISIS videos, encourage the posting of ISIS videos, or make posting ISIS videos easier.”

It’s also irrelevant that YouTube may share ad revenues with ISIS, citing to Blumenthal v. Drudge and Roommates.com, and distinguishing Accusearch because YouTube didn’t actively solicit, or develop the content of, ISIS’s videos.

Out of an abundance of caution, the court gives the plaintiffs the opportunity to file a (third) amended complaint, and I’m sure the plaintiffs will try again. However, the court’s opinion leaves little room for the plaintiffs to marshal better facts that will change the result. So I expect the plaintiffs’ additional attempt will fail. Furthermore, this opinion is thoughtful and well-constructed, so it should fare well on appeal if the case gets that far.

Although this is a nice Section 230 ruling, I have a pit in my stomach about how good rulings like this could turn into a long-term strategic loss. To me, the support-to-terrorist laws closely parallel the support-to-sex-traffickers laws. Both statutory schemes have broad criminal provisions, expansive secondary liability doctrines, supporting federal civil claims, tragic and sympathetic victims, and political toxicity for any opposition. (Though I’ll note one key difference: much content published by terrorists qualifies for the First Amendment, while Backpage v. Lynch suggested that sex trafficking ads never qualify for the First Amendment). Thus, if Congress passes SESTA/the Wagner bill, it will provide a template for similar reform to exclude terrorist victim claims from Section 230. In other words, when courts resoundingly embrace Section 230 as an immunity to wipe away terrorist victim claims, it could have an unfortunate side effect of providing more fuel for statutory reform advocates.

Meanwhile, the Fields v. Twitter case is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which will hear oral arguments in early December. If the Ninth Circuit affirms, I’m hoping that ruling will quell the existing lawsuits against social media sites and discourage new ones. Any other result will produce a litigation fiesta.

Case citation: Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 4773366 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2017)


Source: Eric Goldman Legal

Recent SESTA Developments (A Linkwrap) 0

drudge siren

Publicly, it’s been a little quiet on the SESTA/Wagner bill front since the House hearing in early October. However, activity is taking place behind the scenes. Proponents keep adding cosponsors: now 35 in the Senate and over 160 in the House. Also, backroom discussions are taking place over proposed wording changes. My take is that the proponents are conceding very little ground, despite some obvious problems with the bills that everyone seems to acknowledge should be fixed.

While the backroom activities continue, here is a rundown of recent links:

* Irrespective of its effects on Section 230, it remains unclear if SESTA/Wagner bill actually help sex trafficking victims. You may recall that several anti-sex trafficking advocacy groups opposed SESTA for that very reason (Freedom Network USA, Sacramento Sex Workers Outreach Project, and SWOP-USA). A newly posted paper, Craigslist’s Effect on Violence Against Women, gives us additional data to consider:

Craigslist erotic services reduced the female homicide rate by 17.4 percent. We also find modest evidence that erotic services reduced female rape offenses. Our analysis suggests that this reduction in female violence was the result of street prostitutes moving indoors and matching more efficiently with safer clients.

I expect we’ll have more to say about this paper.

* I made my 17th appearance on This Week in Law (TWiL), featuring superstar host Denise Howell. We spent the first hour discussing SESTA and then segued into a discussion about the Small Justice v. Xcentric ruling. Watch the video.

* The Recorder: In-House Counsel Hold Differing Views on Sex-Trafficking Bill: Quoting Josh King of Avvo as saying “SESTA is a horrible and counterproductive bill.” In an attempt to create faux balance, the article cites “heavy-hitter” bill proponents of Fox, IBM, Disney, HP and Oracle–companies with minimal exposure to user-generated content and little expertise on the law’s subject matter.

Politico: “Tech companies spend big on fight over sex-trafficking bills”: Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, and Apple all reported on their lobbying forms that they lobbied against SESTA and the Wagner bill (Apple only reported lobbying on Section 230, but surely it related to SESTA). Oracle and IBM reported lobbying in favor of SESTA.

* In early October, the House Judiciary Committee’s Crimes Subcommittee held a hearing on the Wagner bill. In her written testimony, Prof. Mary Leary of Catholic University Law School wrote: “Importantly, the legislation leaves Section 230(c), the Good Samaritan immunity section, untouched” (bold in the original). This resembles Sen. Portman’s claim that SESTA doesn’t amend the good samaritan provisions of Section 230(c)(2), a claim I already debunked (and, I believe, most staffers now realize isn’t true, even if Sen. Portman keeps making it). However, Prof. Leary apparently is making an even broader claim that the Wagner bill doesn’t “touch” Section 230(c) at all, not just Section 230(c)(2).

I repeatedly reached out to Prof. Leary asking her to clarify this claim, but she did not respond to my inquiries. Thus, I’m left to speculate how anyone could make this claim–given that the whole point of the Wagner bill is to limit Section 230(c)’s immunity. From my perspective, Prof. Leary’s claim appears to be 100% false–and such a gross misunderstanding of the bill it was designed to support that, I think, the bogus claim taints the entire testimony’s credibility.

Trying to imagine any way Prof. Leary’s claim could be true (without any clarification from her), the best I could come up with is that the Wagner bill would not actually change any words in Section 230(c), it would just amend other parts of Section 230. If that’s where Prof. Leary was going, let’s look at a similar example:

Original Section 1: It’s unlawful to intentionally kill another person.

Newly added Section 2: Section 1 doesn’t apply on any day ending in a “y.”

The newly added Section 2 doesn’t “touch” the wording of Section 1, but I don’t know any credible person who would publicly claim that Section 2 leaves Section 1 “untouched.” Is this really how we’ll make the sausage?

* Cathy Gellis had two interesting posts at Techdirt: (1) “Beyond ICE In Oakland: How SESTA Threatens To Chill Any Online Discussion About Immigration” and (2) “A Joke Tweet Leads To ‘Child Trafficking’ Investigation, Providing More Evidence Of Why SESTA Would Be Abused.” I’d like to think her examples are over-the-top, but her posts deserve your consideration.

More SESTA-Related Posts:

Recent SESTA Developments (A Linkwrap)
Section 230’s Applicability to ‘Inconsistent’ State Laws (Guest Blog Post)
An Overview of Congress’ Pending Legislation on Sex Trafficking (Guest Blog Post)
The DOJ’s Busts of MyRedbook & Rentboy Show How Backpage Might Be Prosecuted (Guest Blog Post)
Problems With SESTA’s Retroactivity Provision (Guest Blog Post)
My Senate Testimony on SESTA + SESTA Hearing Linkwrap
Debunking Some Myths About Section 230 and Sex Trafficking (Guest Blog Post)
Congress Is About To Ruin Its Online Free Speech Masterpiece (Cross-Post)
Backpage Executives Must Face Money Laundering Charges Despite Section 230–People v. Ferrer
How Section 230 Helps Sex Trafficking Victims (and SESTA Would Hurt Them) (guest blog post)
Sen. Portman Says SESTA Doesn’t Affect the Good Samaritan Defense. He’s Wrong
Senate’s “Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017”–and Section 230’s Imminent Evisceration
The “Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017” Bill Would Be Bad News for Section 230
WARNING: Draft “No Immunity for Sex Traffickers Online Act” Bill Poses Major Threat to Section 230
The Implications of Excluding State Crimes from 47 U.S.C. § 230’s Immunity


Source: Eric Goldman Legal

Call for Projects/Papers/Participation for 8th Annual Internet Law Works-in-Progress Conference, NYLS, March 24, 2018 0

Internet Law WIP Logo

Eighth Annual Internet Law Works-in-Progress, March 24, 2018, at New York Law School

Colleagues:

It is my honor to invite you to participate in the Eighth Annual Internet Law Works-in-Progress Conference at New York Law School on March 24, 2018. This conference series, co-sponsored by the Innovation Center for Law and Technology at New York Law School and the High Tech Law Institute at Santa Clara University School of Law, was created for Internet law scholars to receive feedback on their papers and projects from their peers. It is an exciting, informal gathering where we work together to advance scholarship in our field. We also have a lot of fun!

The conference takes a broad view of the topics that fit under the Internet Law umbrella. So, we encourage you to join this growing group of scholars, practitioners, technologists, and social scientists at New York Law School’s campus in TriBeCa.

There are three categories of participation:
1. Papers-in-Progress: This track is for paper drafts sufficiently advanced to share with event attendees. We allocate extra speaking time to these presentations. Papers will be due in the middle of February 2018.
2. Projects-in-Progress: This track is for research projects without a paper draft, covering anything from nearly finished papers to new ideas.
3. Discussant: Space permitting, we welcome you to join the conversation as an active audience participant.

How to Participate

If you would like to join us in New York City in March, please complete this form by November 22, 2017 at 5pm Eastern.

We expect to notify accepted participants in early December. Submissions received after the deadline will be evaluated on a space-available basis.

There is no event participation fee. All participants are responsible for their own travel and lodging expenses. Information about travel and lodging will be provided to all participants. There is no publication obligation associated with presenting at the conference. 

Want to bring friends?

If you know someone who would be interested in joining us, but may not have received this email—namely, is not on our email list or has never attended the conference before—please reach out to Joseph Forgione, Associate Director of the Innovation Center, atjoseph.forgione@nyls.edu, to add that friend’s name to the list. Please also forward this email to all those you think would be interested.

Need More Information?

The initial conference website is up and will be updated regularly with new information. You may also contact Joseph Forgione at joseph.forgione@nyls.edu with any questions.

We hope to see you in March!


Source: Eric Goldman Legal